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FINANCING MICRO AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES 
THROUGH DECREASING PARTNERSHIP (MUSHĀRAKAH 
MUTANĀQISAH): REFINING SHARĪ‛AH AND BANKING 
ASPECTS FOR ENHANCED APPLICABILITY 
 
MUHAMMAD ABDURRAHMAN SADIQUE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Decreasing partnership as proposed by contemporary scholars could be effectively 
employed in financing MMEs, for procurement of assets as well as financing 
complete ventures.  Its significance in financing MMEs could be enhanced through 
giving further prominence to the basis of equity participation, allowing the 
ancillary contracts of ijarah and sale to function independently.  The paper argues 
that the reality of the underlying contracts should be effectively highlighted 
through pricing the units and ijarah rentals realistically, rather than as an 
apportionment of the profit element calculated on the capital outlay.  In financing 
ventures on decreasing partnership, expenses of the venture should be shared 
proportionately; profit share of the bank should decline corresponding to the 
bank’s stake, and unit price of the bank’s share could be fixed based on a price 
negotiated at the time or professional valuation.  The paper seeks to highlight 
many other conditions that are often violated in practice but that must be fulfilled 
in order to ensure full Shari[ah compliance.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Financing micro and medium sized enterprises (MMEs) is a vital area that could 
be modelled based on equity participation, which could facilitate a more equitable 
sharing of returns as well as sustaining losses.  Due to their inability to provide 
acceptable collateral and various other reasons, MMEs generally fail in meeting the 
stringent credit criteria of conventional banks, and rarely qualify for credit lines.  
Conventional banks consider the viability of the venture mainly for assessing the 
credit risk, which would determine the nature of collateral and other security to be 
sought.  Conversely, in adopting equity participation as a medium for financing 
projects, the recovery of the capital along with realising a return is intrinsically 
related to the success of the venture. Demand for collateral would be practically 
relevant only in situations where the entrepreneur is liable for losses, due to reasons 
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such as negligence and fraud.  As such, where the viability of the enterprise could 
be reasonably ascertained, lack of collateral alone need not deter Islamic banks 
from financing on the basis of equity participation, especially due to the fact that 
the bank gains ownership to a portion of the business assets, and the possible 
higher returns realisable as an equity partner. 
 
 Despite of an apparent reluctance on the part of Islamic banks to employ equity 
modes, especially so in the case of MMEs due to the perceived vulnerability and 
augmented risk, equity arrangements appear best suited for the purpose.  In 
financing MMEs, unilateral funding modes such as mudārabah as well as common 
equity participation based on mushārakah could be adopted. However, in ventures 
of medium and long-term duration, termination of equity partnership cannot be 
done abruptly, and a gradual withdrawal may become necessary.  Decreasing 
equity partnership (mushārakah mutanāqisah), a combination mode widely 
adopted by Islamic banks presently for financing ventures and purchase of high-
value assets such as houses, could be an ideal tool for financing MMEs. The 
possibility of equity participation while ensuring an exit mechanism offered by this 
structure provides an appropriate platform for the bank’s involvement.  Financing 
here could include both founding an enterprise jointly as well as joint purchase of 
an existing venture, until it gains sufficient financial strength to acquire total 
ownership.  Decreasing partnership could also be employed in procuring assets 
needed by the enterprise.  Thus, factories, buildings, machinery, equipment, 
tractors, boats, vehicles etc necessary for MMEs could be financed using the 
structure. However, decreasing partnership structures that are presently adopted 
could require further refinement and enhancement for achieving optimum 
performance in MMEs. They could be further upgraded in order to make the 
procedure more reflective of the basis of equity participation, thus ensuring 
bilateral justice and boosting the success and growth of MMEs, leading to a win-
win situation.   
 
 This paper analyses the application of the decreasing partnership format in 
facilitating procurement of assets and financing complete ventures, and examines 
the currently adopted structure from an operational and Shari[ah angle with a view 
to suggesting possible measures for enhancement in order to realise optimum 
suitability in a MME environment.   
 
1.1. Essentials of Decreasing Partnership 
 
 Prior to analysing aspects particularly relevant to financing MMEs, it is 
pertinent to examine the nature of decreasing partnership.  Diminishing or 
decreasing partnership is a structure fundamentally based on equity participation 
that has been proposed for bank financing by a number of contemporary jurists.  
While some have restricted its use to financing assets such as real estate, others 
uphold its use in venture capital financing.  The primary concept of decreasing 
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partnership involves the joint purchase of an asset or a venture by two parties, on 
the assurance given by one of them that the share of the other in the asset or the 
venture would be purchased by the former in stages.  Due to the fact that the share 
of one party, usually that of the financial institution, declines gradually as a result 
of the consecutive purchases by the other, this structure has been referred to as 
musharakah mutanaqisah or decreasing partnership.  Based on the common 
ownership of the parties, any revenue through the asset or the venture would be 
shared between them.  When this structure is adopted for procurement and 
development of assets, the additional feature of ijarah is usually seen to be 
incorporated, however, as an independent contract.  The share of one partner, 
usually that of the Islamic bank, is leased to the other at a fixed rental.  With the 
progressive purchases of the client that result in the decline of the bank’s share, the 
rental too is reduced, based on an undertaking given by the bank to this effect.  
With the client’s purchase of the bank’s share completely, the ijarah terminates 
and the relationship comes to an end.  The structure differs from other asset 
financing modes such as murābahah due to features such as the co-ownership of 
the bank in the asset / venture with the resultant right of the bank to claim a 
proportionate share of any revenue through the asset / venture, and the possible 
incorporation of the rental element.  Several variations to the above process have 
been suggested, all of which, while agreeing on the initial joint ownership, mainly 
differ on the process adopted for the gradual secession of one of the parties.1     
 
 Thus, decreasing partnership, while having an equity relationship as its base, 
also involves the concurrent application of other relationships such as agency, 
ijarah, sale etc, which, although not forming a condition to the validity of the basic 
partnership, are crucial ingredients for the viability of this mode, and necessarily 
adhered to as such.  The component contracts, the synchronized application of 
which gives rise to the multifaceted relationship referred to as decreasing 
partnership, are recognised in Shari[ah, on the basis of which advocates argue for 
the validity of the overall structure. 
 
1.2. Basis of Decreasing Partnership 
 
 Some proponents of decreasing partnership have identified the basic contract 
that forms its core as shirkah al-‛aqd, on which basis they propose its application 
in a large variety of projects, extending from financing the purchase of assets such 
as machinery, factories, and houses to financing large-scale enterprises.  Since the 
                                                 
1 See AAOIFI, Sharī‛a Standards May 2002, p. 214; First Islamic Banking Conference 
Dubai, 22-24 May 1979, held at Dubai Islamic Bank, Fatāwā Shar‛iyyah fī al-A‛māl al-
Masrafiyyah, p. 22; Muhsin Ahmad al-Khudayri, al-Bunūk al-Islāmiyyah, Al-Qāhirah, 
Iytrak li al-Nashr, 1995, p. 133;  Abd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah, “al-Mushārakāt al-
Mutanāqisah wa Dawābituhā al-Shar‛iyyah”, in al-Iqtisād al-Islāmi, No. 277, Rabī‛ al-
Akhir 1425H, vol. 24, p. 217. 
Islamic Finance for Micro and Medium Enterprises 
 
 
56 
partnership is founded from the inception as a contractual partnership, they see no 
bar to utilising this structure for all sorts of financing that give rise to revenue.2  
AAOIFI Shari[ah Standards seems to adopt this position.  However, it does not 
bear any clear reference to utilising decreasing partnership structure in asset 
purchase.3  Others have preferred to regard it as a structure based on shirkah al-
milk when used for the purpose of acquiring assets such as real estate, however, 
allow its application in financing ventures that are based on assets, with some 
necessary guidelines to be observed due the structure taking the form of shirkah al-
[aqd in this instance.4  Where the relationship is categorised as shirkah al-milk, the 
partners could gain certain additional privileges that allow them to guarantee each 
other where necessary, and based on it, to pledge to purchase the other’s share at a 
fixed price.  Similarly, the partners’ liability as well as right to any gain through the 
jointly held property would necessarily be proportionate to their ownership.  
However, when the relationship is identified as shirkah al-[aqd formed through 
investment with a view to sharing profits, purchase of the other’s share at a fixed 
price may not be assured, as this would tantamount to guaranteeing a similar 
amount of the other’s capital.  The latter is not allowed in shirkah al-‛aqd, as such 
an assurance would interfere with the mandatory requirement that liability should 
be shared strictly on the basis of capital participation. 
 
2. DECREASING PARTNERSHIP FOR ASSET PURCHASE 
 
 An important area where decreasing partnership could be used in financing 
MMEs is facilitating the acquirement of assets.  Various assets required by MMEs, 
where Islamic banks would be reluctant in providing debt-based modes such as 
murābahah, could be financed using this structure with a greater level of comfort 
for both the bank as well as the client partner.  This is due to the usual 
incorporation of the ijarah contract that could accommodate delays in meeting 
periodical payments without loss of revenue for the bank, which would not be 
possible in fixed price mechanisms such as murābahah. This aspect also provides a 
greater level of ease to the MME partner, as he is granted more freedom in 
managing liquidity.  However, the prevalent decreasing partnership mechanism 
requires several important adjustments in order to provide such benefits optimally.  
 
2.1. Mechanism 
 
 Decreasing partnership, when applied in projects that involve the procurement 
or development of assets, consists of the joint purchase of an asset by the Islamic 
bank and the client initially.  After the joint purchase of the asset, the client is 
                                                 
2 Abd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah above. 
3 AAOIFI, Sharī‛ah Standards May 2002, p. 214.   
4 Muhammad Taqi Usmāni, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Karachi, Idaratul Ma’arif, 
2000, p. 91.    
M Abdurrahman Sadique: Financing MMEs through Decreasing Partnership 
 
57 
required to purchase the share of the bank on a staggered basis based on a 
preceding promise made by the client to the effect, through purchasing a portion at 
equal intervals until the whole asset is owned by the client.  The price of each unit 
of the bank’s share is usually fixed beforehand.  If the asset purchased is proposed 
for utility such as buildings and machinery, the client is allowed to commence 
using it soon after the joint purchase, where the share of the bank would be leased 
to him for the purpose, under a separate ijarah agreement, at a fixed rental.  The 
share of the bank would successively decrease due to the periodic purchases by the 
client, as a result of which adjustment to the initial rental becomes necessary.  This 
is achieved by a separate undertaking proffered by the bank that in the event the 
client purchase the share of the bank in units, the rental would be reduced 
accordingly, to reflect the reduced ownership of the bank.  A rental schedule for the 
purpose usually accompanies the undertaking.  With the purchase of the last unit by 
the client, the asset becomes wholly owned by him, terminating the ijarah contract 
simultaneously. 
 
2.2. Major Sharī‛ah Issues 
 
 As far as creating common ownership over an asset through joint purchase is 
concerned, this is evidently recognised as valid in all schools of Islamic law.5  
When a partner appoints the other as his agent for the joint purchase of a specific 
asset, the latter becomes jointly owned by the partners upon purchase.  In a jointly 
owned asset, a co-owner may sell his share or a part of it to the other without any 
objection.6  Similarly, a co-owner of an undivided asset could lease his share to the 
other party under an ijarah agreement.7  These being the basic constituent contracts 
found in decreasing partnership, when regarded independently, they are not 
understood to involve any aspect objected to in Shari[ah.  Despite of this, various 
other aspects of Shari[ah relevance are found in the decreasing partnership 
mechanism as enumerated hereunder, some of which are also common to structures 
for financing ventures.  All of these are pertinent to financing MMEs. 
                                                 
5 Shams al-Dīn al-Ramli, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Bayrūt, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, n.d., vol. 
5, p. 8,  Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, Bayrūt, Dar al-Fikr, 1992, vol. 5, p. 
122, ‛Alā al-Dīn al-Kāsāni, al-Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Bayrūt, Dar al-Ma‛rifah, 2000, vol. 6, p. 
90.   
6 Muhammad Amīn Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Radd al-Muhtār, Bayrūt, Dar al-Fikr, 1979, vol. 4, pp. 300 
– 304; Abd al-Rahmān al-Jazīri, Kitab al-Fiqh ‛ala al-Madhāhib al-Arba‛ah, Bayrūt, Dar 
al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1986, vol. 3, pp. 65, 69. al-Kāsāni, al-Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 5, p. 
168, Sulaymān ibn ‛Umar al-Bujayrami, Hāshiyah al-Bujayrami, Diyār Bakr Turkiya, al-
Makatabah al-Islāmiyyah, vol. 3, p. 107, Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi, al-Majmū‛, 
Bayrūt, Dar al-Fikr, 1996, vol. 9, p. 273.   
7 Al-Majallah, article 429, vol. 1, p. 83, Abū Ishāq ibn Muflih, al-Mubdi‛, Bayrūt, al-
Maktab al-Isāmi, 1400H, vol. 5, p. 79, ‛Ali ibn Sulaymān al-Mardāwi, al-Insāf, Bayrūt, Dar 
Ihya al-Turāth al-‛Arabi, n.d., vol. 6, p. 33, Mansūr ibn Yūnus al-Bahūti, Kashshāf al-
Qinā‛, Bayrūt, Dar al-Fikr, 1402H, vol. 3, p. 563.   
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 A major Shari[ah concern that is not confined to decreasing partnership alone is 
the level of Shari[ah acceptability of amalgamating various contracts together in a 
single process with the connivance of the contracting parties.  Whether contractual 
promises could be held enforceable, and whether an individual binding promise, 
offered by the client at the time of finalising the shirkah agreement or the joint 
purchase that the bank’s share would be purchased by him subsequently, is 
substantially different from an instance where two transactions are made 
conditional to each other, too are important Shari[ah aspects.  Contemporary 
scholars recognise enforceability of contractual promises in certain situations, and 
regard that an individual promise that is not related to the text of a contract may not 
be compared to a condition for the validity of the latter.  Therefore, it is necessary 
that the client’s agreement to purchase the bank’s share in units take the form of a 
unilateral promise made separately.8 
 
 In assets such as real estate and vehicles where registration with the relevant 
authority is mandatory in many jurisdictions, the legal title to the asset is usually 
transferred from the original owner, i.e. the housing development firm or the 
vehicle dealer, to the client directly.  Thus, from a conventional legal standpoint, 
the bank’s involvement in the asset is limited to its financial interest, while the 
legal ownership rests on the client solely.  To smoothen the issue from a Shari[ah 
angle, the client is appointed as the bank’s agent to carry out the purchase of the 
asset and to hold its legal title.  Therefore, in spite of having the legal title to the 
asset, the client is considered the owner of only a part of it initially, i.e. to the 
extent of his participation in the cost of purchase, and would gain complete 
ownership only at the end of the tenure.   
 
 In order to secure the bank’s interest legally in this instance, a legal mortgage 
over the whole asset is usually drawn in favour of the bank.   This document is not 
reflective of the true state pertaining to ownership of the asset, as it reflects the 
position of the bank as that of a mortgagee who is entitled to monetary dues from 
the mortgagor.  Although not appearing on the deed of mortgage, its applicability is 
considered limited to the share owned by the client, mortgaged in favour of the 
bank for securing ijarāh rentals and actual damages to the bank due to possible 
non-adherence to the promise to purchase. 
 
                                                 
8 Islamic Fiqh Academy, 5th Session held in Kuwait, December 1988, Resolutions Nos. 40-
41 (2/5 & 3/5); Muhammad Taqi Usmani, “al-Turuq al-Mashrū‛ah li al-Tamwīl al-‛Iqārī”, 
in Buhūth fī Qadāyah Fiqhiyyah Mu‛āsirah, Karachi, Maktabah Darul Ulūm, 1996, and An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance, pp. 120-126, 87-89; Wahbah al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islāmi 
wa Adillatuh, Bayrūt, Dar al-Fikr, 2000, vol. 4, pp. 2928-2930. Enforceability of promises 
in the context of murābahah has also been upheld by other bodies such as the Second 
Conference of Islamic banks held in Kuwait, March 1983. 
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 In the course of the decreasing partnership process, the client is expected to 
purchase the undivided share of the bank in units, usually at pre-agreed intervals.  
The purchase of each unit would form a separate transaction that should necessarily 
fulfil the requirements pertaining to sales.  Thus, it is emphasised that the sale here 
take place through a proper offer and acceptance, accurately describing the nature 
of the unit purchase and the price, through which the ownership of the unit would 
transfer to the client.9  This would allow the reality of the transaction to be 
manifested duly, in addition to rectifying the approach of the client as well as the 
bank towards the transaction. 
 
 In the event of any reluctance on the part of the client to purchase the units as 
promised, contemporary scholars regard the bank justified in demanding his 
performance.  In the event of non-compliance, the bank may recover the actual 
damages suffered due to the client’s failure to fulfil his promise.  This could 
provide the bank with the necessary validation for commencing legal procedures 
for liquidation of the mortgage.  However, it is clear that if the mortgage is 
liquidated, the bank would be justified only in recovering the actual damages 
suffered due the client’s non-purchasing, together with the ijarah rentals for the 
bank’s portion of the asset for the period.  Any balance remaining of the sale price 
of the client’s share should necessarily be given to him. 
 
 It could be seen from the above that obtaining legal title to the property in the 
name of the client solely, followed by a legal mortgage over the same, amounts to a 
misrepresentation of the underlying transaction of co-purchase.  Registering both 
the bank and the client as co-owners is not generally favoured due to the 
involvement of multiple legal costs in transferring the bank’s share to the client at 
the end.  The long-term alternative would be to attempt to obtain legal recognition 
of the promises and other transactional documents executed in Islamic banking 
operations at least to a limited extent, with exemption from duties and other taxes 
normally involved.10  Such a step could facilitate financing MMEs greatly.  This 
could also result in an increased sense of responsibility in both the bank and the 
clients in carrying out such transactions.  It should not be forgotten that irrespective 
of whether legal recognition is awarded, all transactions carried out by the bank, 
when found to fulfil the necessary criteria, are valid and enforceable in Shari[ah, 
and give rise to legal consequences such as transfer of ownership, liability for 
expenses and right to revenue. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Muhammad Taqi Usmāni, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, p. 90.   
10 The issue of double stamp duty had been solved in the context of Islamic mortgages in 
UK, which could set a precedent for other countries.  However, the legal status of Islamic 
banking transactional documents is yet to be asserted.       
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Implications of the bank’s co-ownership in the asset 
 
 As a result of the joint purchase, responsibilities pertaining to ownership would 
necessarily be attached to the bank, proportionate to its ownership.  Similarly, a 
proportionate share of any increase or revenue generated by the asset could be 
claimed by the bank.  The latter aspect is discussed below under decreasing 
partnership in ventures.  Consequently, liabilities pertaining to ownership such as 
major repairs, risk of loss or destruction etc should be shared by the bank 
proportionately.  These liabilities may not be transferred to the client even though 
the bank’s share is leased to him, because they fall on the lessor even in ijarah.  
Minor repairs and upkeep necessary for usage could be assigned to the client as a 
lessee is required to bear them.  Therefore, in spite of any reference to the bank in 
the legal documents as a mortgagee, liabilities inherent to ownership would 
necessarily fall on the bank proportionately.  Such sharing of liability, if genuinely 
undertaken, could be a major boost to MMEs, and could serve as a key 
differentiator between mushārakah mutanāqisah and interest based facilities. 
 
 On the other hand, due to the fact that decreasing partnership involves co-
owning the asset for a relatively long duration, the bank exercising due care in the 
co-purchase of the asset becomes necessary.  Although the client could be made 
responsible for the selection of the asset, if the latter is unable to provide the 
usufruct expected there would be no justification for charging ijarah rentals.  If the 
client refuses to purchase the bank’s share as a result and the asset has to be 
liquidated, recovery of the bank’s capital outlay may prove difficult unless if 
additional security is available.  Even when the asset fetches a higher price, 
recovery of rentals may not be justified if the asset had been unusable.  Thus, co-
purchase dictates that these aspects that are necessary features of ownership and 
ijarah be kept in view at the time. 
 
Lease of bank’s share to the client 
 
 Decreasing partnership in asset purchases usually involves lease of the bank’s 
share of the asset to the client through an ijarah agreement.  A separate 
undertaking to reduce the rental in the event of the client purchasing units of the 
bank’s share is made concurrently by the bank.  This undertaking, made 
unilaterally by the bank without forming part of the ijarah agreement or the joint 
purchase, mentions the reductions in rental that would take place periodically 
according to the decline in the bank’s share, subject to the client’s purchase of 
units.  Being separate unrelated transactions carried out individually that are not 
conditional to each other, these are not understood to impair the validity of the 
procedure.   
 
 If this procedure is held valid, it is necessary to observe Shari[ah rulings 
pertaining to the lessor / lessee relationship.  Thus, although expenses related to 
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minor wear and tear could be assigned to the client, major repairs and overhauls 
would necessarily have to be borne by the bank proportionate to its ownership.  
This is also necessary for stressing the bank’s role as a co-owner and ijarah lessor, 
instead of that of a lender or financial lessor whose interest in the asset is limited to 
his financial dues.  In addition, the danger of ijarah rentals being misunderstood as 
interest on the bank’s remaining capital exposure should not be underestimated.  
To mitigate this possibility, suggestions offered below regarding the pricing of 
units and rentals as well as the obligation on the client to purchase could be 
considered. 
 
Fixing unit prices and ijarah rentals 
 
 Subsequent to the bank’s becoming a co-owner of the asset in a Shari[ah 
perspective through joint purchase, while the bank’s share is leased out to the client 
based on an ijarah agreement, at periodic intervals, the bank’s share is sold to the 
client in units.  The recovery of the capital involved in the facility along with a 
profit is realised in the form of sale prices of units and ijarah rentals.  While the 
ijarah rental for the whole of the bank’s share is fixed at the outset to be reduced 
gradually based on the undertaking to do so, whether the sale price of units could 
be thus fixed at the inception is a matter of difference among contemporary 
scholars.  Contemporary scholars who regard decreasing partnership to consist of 
shirkah al-milk when utilised for asset purchases, while encouraging the price of 
units be fixed based on market value, have also allowed prior agreement between 
the bank and client regarding it.11  Thus, the promise to purchase offered by the 
client could indicate the prices to be paid for the units.  This is justified based on 
the fact that the partners here are mere joint owners in an asset, who have not 
entered into a joint venture for investing their capitals or to realise a gain through 
the sale of the asset to a third party.  As such, the question of a partner 
guaranteeing the other’s capital, which would occur had the partnership been based 
on shirkah al-‛aqd, is not relevant here. Others who uphold shirkah al-‛aqd as the 
universal basis of the procedure, consider such prior agreement impermissible.12  
This ruling also aims at safeguarding decreasing partnership from becoming a mere 
interest-based financing transaction in which a client undertakes to pay another 
party for his finance, in addition to a share in the partnership income.13 
 
Issues on fixing unit price and rental 
 
 If the mushārakah mutanāqisah structure is to be employed for financing 
MMEs with any measure of success, an aspect of paramount importance would be 
the pricing mechanism adopted for fixing unit prices and ijarah rental.  A 
                                                 
11 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, p. 83.   
12 See section above on basis of decreasing partnership.   
13 AAOIFI, Sharī‛ah Standards May 2002, p. 225.   
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drawback that is found in the practical application of the current structure for asset 
purchases is that the purchase prices of the units and the ijarah rentals are not 
found to have any relationship with the market value of the asset or its utility.  The 
bank’s intent is seen limited to recovering its capital together with an amount of 
return relative to the period of exposure, calculated based on the rate of return 
applicable to such facilities.  Thus, considering the fact that the bank’s share is 
divided into equal units, while the nature of the equity relationship could call for 
the unit prices to be similar and the rentals to decrease according to consecutive 
purchases effected by the client reflective of the portion remaining in the 
ownership of the bank after each purchase, the usual practice of banks is found to 
be different.  The periodical purchase and payment of rental by the client are taken 
as a single payment, which is usually fixed as a uniform figure throughout the 
tenure of the facility.  The components of unit price and rental comprising each 
payment are fixed with the aid of discounted cash flow technique, where the unit 
price is seen to increase while the rental amount diminishes progressively, without 
much relation to the number of units owned by the bank at each stage.  While a 
perceived benefit here is that the client is required to pay a fixed total sum 
throughout, this method defeats a proper appreciation of the nature of decreasing 
partnership to a great extent, in that the client is made to understand from the 
process that a simple repayment of the bank’s capital outlay is effected monthly 
with a margin of profit.  This lack of appreciation is seen to manifest in the 
reluctance to carry out the offer and acceptance procedure for each unit purchase, 
as mere payment of the total ‘instalment’ is considered enough.   
 
 Treating the unit price and rental as a single payment could lead to another 
aspect that downplays the equity relationship.  When units are not purchased at 
intervals as agreed, the terms of the ijarah agreement and the undertaking would 
require that no change take place in the rental.  This is because the rental would be 
subject to adjustment only when the ownership of the bank is reduced due to the 
purchase of units.  At any point of the tenure, if a unit is not purchased at the 
appointed interval, the share owned by the bank would remain unchanged.  Thus, 
until another unit purchase is effected, the same amount of rental as was due earlier 
would remain payable periodically.  However, if the unit price and the rental are 
taken as a lump sum payment regardless of its composition, the client could be 
understood only to have defaulted in meeting an instalment.  Due to treating the 
amount thus as any instalment outstanding through other modes such as 
murābahah, its payment within the tenure could be considered sufficient.  Thus, 
the ijarah rental would be taken to reduce automatically irrespective of whether a 
unit purchase was done at the right time or not.  While this could be advantageous 
to the client, the reality and the significance of the underlying contracts of sale and 
ijarah are brought into question here through their apparent inefficacy. 
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Illustration 
 
 The following example could illustrate this point.  Let us imagine the joint 
purchase of a property on decreasing partnership where the client’s purchase of the 
bank’s share is planned to take place in ten months in ten equal units.  The unit 
price is fixed as P while the monthly rental for each unit is R.  The rental due for 
the whole share of the bank being 10R, at the end of the first month, the total sum 
payable by the client, for purchase of one unit together with the rental, is (P + 
10R).  (As explained above, mere payment here would not be sufficient.  The 
purchase should be concluded properly through the exchange of an offer and 
acceptance.  If this is not done, the unit price paid would remain as an advance paid 
on account for a future purchase.)  If a unit was purchased at the end of the first 
month, the rental is payable at the end of the second month only for nine units.  
Thus, the sum payable at the end of the second month would be (P + 9R).  Let us 
imagine that the client did not purchase a unit at the end of the second month, i.e. 
the rental too was not paid, as both are usually paid together.  In this instance, the 
rental would not decrease at the end of the second month, due to the share of the 
bank remaining the same.  Thus, at the end of the third month, if the client were to 
pay both ‘instalments’ together through the purchase of two units at once, the sums 
payable would be (P + 9R) + (P + 9R).  Thereafter, at the end of the fourth month, 
the total sum payable would be (P + 7R).  A table illustrating an asset divided into 
ten units with deferment of purchase in the 2nd, 7th and 8th months is given below. 
 
Table 1. Unit Price and Rental in Decreasing Partnership  
in the Event of Irregular Payments 
 
 1
st 
month 
2nd 
month 
3rd 
month 
4th 
month 
5th 
month 
6th 
month 
7th 
month 
8th 
month 
9th 
month 
10th 
month 
Units owned 
by client 
during month 
- 1 1 3 4 5 6 6 6 9 
Units owned 
by bank 
during month 
10 9 9 7 6 5 4 4 4 1 
Total rental 
due at end of 
month 
10R 9R 2(9R) 7R 6R 5R 4R 2(4R) 3(4R) R 
New units 
purchased at 
end of month 
1 - 2 1 1 1 - - 3 1 
Total Amount 
paid at end of 
month 
P + 
10R - 
2P + 
2(9R) 
P + 
7R 
P + 
6R 
P + 
5R - - 
3P + 
3(4R) P + R 
 
 Nevertheless, in the current scenario, when the unit prices and rentals are fixed 
with the aid of discounted cash flow method where a major part of the initial 
‘instalments’ are treated to consist of the profit element, i.e. rental, while the 
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capital element, i.e. unit price, therein is negligible, it is not seen practicable to 
alter the rentals only based on unit purchases even when these are delayed, as 
dictated by the reality of the transaction.  This is because, in the case of a non-
purchase occurring during the initial months, an unrealistically large amount would 
be payable as additional rental, as the rental component is substantial during the 
early period.  However, when the rental component is not regarded in its proper 
perspective and is made payable thus with little consideration for purchase of units 
or the remaining share of the bank, the function of the basic contracts comprising 
decreasing partnership could become neglected.   
 
2.3. Suggestions for Enhancement  
 
 The decreasing partnership mechanism as endorsed by a number of 
contemporary scholars could be a highly viable tool in facilitating MMEs to 
procure necessary assets.  Its potential in enhancing the revenue of Islamic banks 
and their depositors through the operation of the ijarah is a noteworthy feature that 
differentiates it from fixed price mechanisms such as murābahah.  By means of the 
ijarah contract, a great amount of flexibility could be created in the operation, 
which, in addition to bringing in additional revenue for the bank in an acceptable 
manner thus compensating for the delay, could provide MMEs with an additional 
measure of ease in meeting payments.  This would facilitate MMEs more freedom 
in deciding the duration of the bank’s involvement in the asset.  However, in order 
to avoid issues such as outlined above and improve efficiency of the mechanism, 
some suggestions are offered hereunder.  
 
 A primary measure needed in this respect is to effectively highlight the reality 
of the underlying contracts, through pricing the units as well as the rentals more 
realistically.  Unit prices and rentals could be fixed in a manner that is more 
reflective of the gradual decrease of the bank’s share.  Adopting the discounted 
cash flow technique in a direct fashion for this purpose could result in 
misrepresenting the essence of the structure seriously, while making its application 
unrealistic in instances of delay in unit purchase.  Therefore, it is necessary that the 
core contracts comprising decreasing partnership be given a higher level of 
visibility by allowing their smooth operation independently.  This is all the more 
important for avoiding treatment of the structure as an interest-based scheme. 
 
 For this purpose, it appears that the purchase of units should be dissociated from 
payment of ijarah rentals, thus thwarting the possibility of misunderstanding the 
simultaneous payment of both as an ‘instalment’.  The bank’s share could 
preferably be divided into equal units, priced evenly.14  The client may be allowed 
                                                 
14 As mentioned above, the basis of decreasing partnership in assets, i.e. whether it forms 
shirkah al-milk or shirkah al-‛aqd would determine pricing of the units largely.  See section 
above on basis of decreasing partnership.     
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the facility of depositing a portion of the purchase price when convenient, the sale 
of the unit only taking place when the complete price for a unit is paid.  This could 
be especially welcome in the case of MMEs, where management of cash flow 
could be a serious issue.  The sale, formally finalised through proper offer and 
acceptance, would result in the transfer of the unit’s ownership to the client, while 
resulting in the reduction of the rental based on the undertaking provided by the 
bank.   
 
 Instead of making the unit purchase mandatory at defined intervals, the 
procedure could provide more choice to the client on the issue, by allowing him to 
complete purchase of the bank’s share within a defined period.  For instance, if the 
bank’s share was divided into thirty-six units, instead of scheduling the purchase to 
take place in three years, a duration of five years could be allowed for the purpose.  
The client would be permitted to purchase units during the period whenever his 
cash position allows him to do so, singly or several units together.  The delay in 
purchase of the units would not create a loss for the bank as rentals would keep 
accruing for the unpurchased units.   
 
 Payment of ijarah rentals could be carried out as a process that is separate from 
that of unit purchases. Ijarah rentals should be fixed in a manner that defines the 
rental for each unit of the bank’s share, where an equal amount of rental is fixed for 
every unit.  Thus, the amount of rental to be paid would depend directly on the 
number of units owned by the bank at the time.  If the client puts off purchase of 
units for several months, the previous rental would remain applicable during 
period, as the bank’s share would remain unreduced.  As mentioned before, this 
would call for the rentals to be fixed in a more realistic and uniform manner than 
by a direct application of the discounted cash flow method.  Thus, the amount of 
rental on the remaining units throughout the tenure should be priced in such a way 
that the client could afford to pay additional rentals when postponing the purchase 
of an instalment becomes necessary, while discouraging undue delay in this regard 
resulting in the unnecessary prolongation of the ijarah. Although a strict 
application of market rates may not be necessary as this could defeat the purpose of 
the client in opting for the facility, the rentals should be fixed in a reasonable 
manner that is reflective of the bank’s co-ownership.  When the client needs to 
extend the ijarah beyond the stipulated period, this could be accommodated based 
on the previous rental structure or a new one, as agreed beforehand. 
 
 It is clear that when the units are equal and the rental is directly proportionate to 
the number of units, a higher rental would be payable initially, that would 
gradually decrease according to the unit purchases effected by the client.  Despite 
of the fact that here the total amount payable by the client differs from month to 
month, thus resulting in the variation of the total amount payable by the client 
every month, it may be preferable to adopt this method as it serves the purpose of 
differentiating decreasing partnership from instalment payments.  However, if the 
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client desires to pay an equal amount monthly, this could be done through fixing 
the total payable as an equal amount every month, where a part would consist of 
the complete purchase price of a unit while the balance goes towards settling the 
rental.  It is evident that here the amount paid for rental would not be sufficient for 
covering the total rental in the initial months, which would be matched by the 
amount exceeding the rentals towards the end of the tenure.  Allowing the client to 
pay part of the rental in the initial months is preferable to recovering the rental in 
full from the fixed amount while leaving the unit price incomplete, as the balance 
in this instance not being sufficient for the purchase of a unit, the client would be 
obliged to pay additional rental until its purchase through the subsequent payment.  
It may not be practicable to allow purchase of units on credit.   
 
 A necessary practical measure for removing the inherent danger of rentals on 
units being perceived as interest on capital is to emphasise the co-ownership of the 
bank in the asset.  The contracts of sale, lease as well as the equity relationship 
could only be held real when the obligations attached to these capacities are 
effectively discharged.  Thus, in each venture financed, ways of strengthening the 
bank’s function in these capacities should be ascertained.  It should be noted that as 
the legal mortgage over the asset could weaken this image through projecting the 
bank as a lender, an alternative method for asserting the bank’s ownership should 
be explored.  As stated earlier, obtaining legal recognition for transactional 
documents could rectify the situation greatly. Educating clients as well as staff on 
the concept of decreasing partnership would be essential in the initial stages.   
 
Allowing client the option to purchase units or continue the lease 
 
 Finally, if the provision that the promise to purchase extended by the client be 
legally enforceable could be dispensed with, it could result in some additional 
flexibility in the procedure for MMEs.  Instead of the mandatory purchase of the 
share of the bank, the client could be given the choice to continue the ijarah 
through extending it with the bank’s agreement.  The objection of making diverse 
contracts conditional to each other may be substantially eliminated through this 
measure, thereby making the structure further acceptable from a Shari[ah 
perspective.  It should be noted that when the promise to purchase is made legally 
binding, the materialisation of the contract as planned is assured for all intents and 
purposes.  Thus, there remains little more than a dialectical justification for not 
considering the promise to be a full-fledged contract mutually concluded, as any 
possibility of a refusal on the bank’s part to conclude the contract is only a remote 
theoretical possibility.  This is because the insistence on the legal enforcement of 
the promise comes from the bank itself.  Therefore, although such measures could 
be adopted with the sanction of Shari[ah experts where necessary, the delicate 
reasoning employed in the process should not be lost sight of.  Some of the critical 
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observations made in this regard by analysts seem not to be devoid of merit.15  
Another option that could be availed of is that instead of the client, the bank should 
provide a promise to the effect that it would sell its share to the client, as has been 
proposed by some contemporary scholars.16  It is noteworthy in this regard that the 
first ruling issued by a body of contemporary scholars on the decreasing 
partnership structure envisaged that both the client as well as the bank be given the 
freedom to sell their shares to each other or to outside parties.17 
 
 If the client were to be given a choice between purchasing the bank’s share and 
continuing the ijarah, this could call for several important adjustments.  A possibly 
beneficial measure is that the bank would be required to scrutinise the nature of the 
asset more thoroughly, in order to verify its worth and suitability for ijarah. 
Although this aspect was incumbent on the bank due to its gaining co-ownership as 
explained above, the possibility of a long-term ijarah would require the bank to be 
even more earnest in this respect.  Another vital requirement in this event is that the 
ijarah rentals be fixed in a realistic manner, rather than as an apportionment of the 
profit element expected on the capital outlay.  In addition, as stated above, such a 
rental arrangement that is more correlated to the nature of the asset rather than 
merely to the capital, would enhance the equity aspect of the relationship greatly.   
 
3. DECREASING PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCING VENTURES 
 
 Some contemporary scholars hold decreasing partnership the best suited 
structure for all types of project financing in the modern context.18  The structure as 
validated by contemporary scholars could be effectively utilised in financing 
MMEs, with distinct advantages for both the financier and the entrepreneur.  In 
addition to the prospect of sharing in unlimited profits due to all profits being 
divided proportionately, if the venture becomes successful, the bank could expect 
to earn a sizable profit through the sale of its share to the client, as the price for 
such sales would be based on market value.  Being a co-partner who is able to 
contribute towards the venture, the bank may also consider specialised services it 
may carry out towards the project, and where worthwhile, hire staff and expertise 
necessary for the purpose.  Thus, major advantages to the bank lie in the possibility 
                                                 
15 See Frank E Vogel and Samuel L Hayes III, Islamic Law and Finance, p. 126-128.  
Discussing some examples, the authors maintain that acknowledging future promises as 
binding risks subverting a basic principle of the Islamic contractual scheme as it has been 
known upto now, and that this risk persists even if the promise is seen as merely unilateral 
or is enforced only by damages awards.   
16 Abd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah, p. 26.   
17 First Conference of Islamic banking held in Dubai, May 1979, Resolution on decreasing 
partnership structure, in Dubai Islamic Bank, Fatāwā Shar‛iyyah fī al-A‛māl al-
Masrafiyyah, p. 21.     
18 Abd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah, p. 24.   
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of contributing effectively in the management of the venture and monitoring its 
progress as enabled by the joint equity participation, as well as the ability to carry 
out a smooth withdrawal while making a gain through both dividends and the sale 
of its share to the client partner.  The MME could benefit through the profit / loss 
sharing structure that facilitates enhancing the capital base and the cash position 
without placing an undue burden on the enterprise in the form of interest payments, 
the expertise and supervision extended by the bank, and the possibility of gradually 
redeeming total ownership by purchasing the bank’s share through profits realised. 
 
3.1. Mechanism 
 
 The basic ingredients of the decreasing partnership structures advocated by 
contemporary scholars for financing ventures, for the most part, are found to be 
similar to those for asset financing.  The mechanism here involves joint investment 
by the bank and the client towards a venture, the share of the bank in which would 
be later purchased by the client in stages, until the client becomes the sole owner of 
the project.  Although similar in these fundamental ingredients, decreasing 
partnership for ventures embodies several major differences.  Among these is the 
identity of the partnership, which, as explained before, is based on shirkah al-‛aqd.  
As a result, rules pertaining to shirkah al-‛aqd would become applicable in such 
ventures.  Division of profits realised through the venture could be agreed to take 
place on a proportion other than that of ownership, based on the position of the 
Hanafi and Hanbali schools.19  However, loss would necessarily be divided on the 
ratio of ownership.  In addition, the share of the bank could be sold to the client at a 
price negotiated by them at the point of sale, if necessary based on a valuation of 
the business done by a party chosen mutually.  Prior agreement regarding the price 
of the bank’s share or indicating the price payable in a promise to purchase / sell 
provided by either of them is not admissible, in order to avoid guaranteeing the 
capital of the other party to that extent.  Within this broad framework, diverse 
formats have been proposed by contemporary scholars.20  Through these structures, 
financing for a large variety of MMEs of different types and durations could be 
facilitated.   
 
3.2. Major Sharī‛ah Issues   
 
 While, some of the Shari[ah issues outlined above under asset financing are also 
applicable to structures for financing ventures, certain additional issues more 
pertinent to the latter are delineated hereunder.  It could be seen the all of these 
issues are greatly relevant to financing MMEs, and being aspects that are reflective 
of equity participation, could play an important role in boosting their success.   
 
                                                 
19 Al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, vol. 6, p. 94, Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, p. 140.   
20 See note under asset financing for references.   
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 Although decreasing partnership for ventures involves inception of a 
partnership for generating income, some scholars have pointed out certain 
instances where such partnership could be established based on shirkah al-milk.  
These pertain to joint purchase of assets that provide an income such as purchase of 
buildings, machinery or vehicles for lease or hire.  In such instances, decreasing 
partnership could be based on shirkah al-milk.21  As such, the division of revenue 
should be on the proportion of ownership.  Therefore, when the proportion of 
ownership becomes altered upon the MME partner purchasing a part of the bank’s 
share, the ratio or profit division too would change accordingly.  With the gradual 
decline of the bank’s stake in the MME, its profit share too would be subject to 
reduction. 
 
 The profit sharing ratio for division of final profits would be agreed at the 
inception.  Some contemporary scholars allow the partners to agree on a ratio 
different from that of capital participation, which could remain static throughout 
the tenure of partnership or be pre-agreed to vary at stipulated intervals, based on 
the client’s purchase of the bank share or otherwise.  Along with such agreement, 
they could arrive at an understanding on the amount of profit that should be set 
aside from the client’s share of profits for purchasing the bank’s share in the 
enterprise.  Either the whole of the client’s share of profits or a specific portion at 
every profit division would be agreed to be set aside.  AAOIFI Shari’a Standards 
suggests that the client could promise to set aside a portion of the profit of the 
return he may earn from the partnership for this purpose.22 
 
 Mobilising the funds and investment will be undertaken jointly by the bank and 
the MME client.  Where the bank does not have the expertise or capability of 
undertaking its share of management and other duties, the client may be entrusted 
with representing the bank in operating the project.  However, the bank would be 
entitled to monitor the progress of the enterprise as well as taking an active role in 
auditing financial and other aspects.  It may reserve for itself such tasks as receipt 
of income through the venture and managing finances.  All income through the 
venture would be credited to the common funds of the venture, and a partner would 
not be given exclusive rights to any income.  Expenses would be undertaken from 
the joint capital, i.e. common funds of the enterprise, so that a partner is not 
obliged with bearing them to the exclusion of the other. 
 
 After the commencement of the enterprise, the client could start to purchase the 
share of the bank in units, based on a price negotiated at that time or professional 
valuation, as agreed.  The price for the bank’s share would depend to a great extent 
on the performance of the enterprise at the points of time its units are purchased by 
the client.  Purchase of shares could be agreed to commence when the project 
                                                 
21 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, p. 90.   
22 AAOIFI, Shari[ah Standards May 2002, p. 215.   
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becomes functional and starts generating revenue.  When all the units of the bank’s 
share have been completely purchased by the MME partner, he becomes the sole 
owner of the venture, and would be entitled to all revenue generated.  All functions 
carried out by the bank for the venture will be transferred to the client, and any 
existent mortgage in favour of the bank will be cancelled at the exit of the bank 
from the partnership.    
 
3.3. Observations on Decreasing Participation for Ventures 
 
 Observations made earlier on the decreasing partnership structure for asset 
purchases would, in a number of instances, be applicable to structures for financing 
ventures as well.23  Some additional aspects are explored hereunder.    
 
Issues pertaining to promise to purchase / sell 
 
 Similar to asset financing, an important aspect relevant to MMEs in structures 
for venture financing is the promise extended by the bank or the client regarding 
the sale of the bank’s share in units.  AAOIFI Shari[ah Standards rules that a 
binding promise could be given by one partner, which entitles the other partner to 
acquire his equity share gradually.24  This implies that the promise is made by the 
bank.  In a number of formats adopted, the client’s portion of the profits is retained, 
either partly or in full, in order to facilitate the purchase of units.  With regard to 
MMEs, it appears that such purchase could largely depend on the profitability of 
the enterprise.  If the enterprise has not been able to generate sufficient profits, the 
client may not be able to purchase as agreed.  In this event, if the promise to 
purchase had been extended by him, it is important to resolve whether the client 
could be required to purchase using his personal funds.  It appears that if the legally 
binding promise had stipulated the intervals at which the client is bound to 
purchase, he may be required to adhere to the schedule in spite of the performance 
of the venture.  However, as pointed out earlier25, since the legal enforceability of 
the promise could usually materialise only in the form of liquidating the mortgage, 
it is improbable that this measure would be resorted to except at the end of the 
tenure.  Similarly, the bank’s commitment to sell also could be important.  This is 
because, in a situation where the client offer to purchase a unit when the enterprise 
is generating low profits and is valued low, if it is expected to give higher levels of 
income in the near future, in spite of the client’s offer, the bank could be induced to 
put off the sale until the value of the business rises.  On the other hand, if the bank 
had provided a promise to sell, the client could offer to purchase when the value of 
                                                 
23 See ‘major Sharī‛ah issues relevant to decreasing partnership’ and ‘suggestions for 
enhancement’ above.    
24 AAOIFI, Sharī‛ah Standards May 2002, p. 214.   
25 See ‘major Sharī‛ah issues relevant to decreasing partnership’ above.  
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the business is at its lowest or when the business is undergoing a spell of losses, 
which the bank would still be bound to honour.   
 
 Possibly as a response to such issues, some contemporary scholars have put 
forth the novel suggestion that the sale of the bank’s share may take place based on 
mutually binding promises made by both the bank and the client. 26  This is based 
on the argument that a binding mutual promise to sell and purchase in the future, 
although similar to a future sale as far as the outcome is concerned, is essentially 
different from the latter.  Thus, a mutual promise for the purpose may not be ruled 
prohibited per se.  Consequently, this suggestion considers that although mutual 
promise is objectionable in the context of murābahah, it may be allowed in 
decreasing partnership.27  Accordingly, the bank and the client could execute 
mutual promises regarding the sale of the bank’s share, and depending on the terms 
of the promises, when an offer is made by one party, the other would be bound to 
accept it.  Therefore, although the price of the units are left to be determined based 
on valuation or mutual agreement at the point of sale, the ownership change 
according to the agreed schedule and terms would be certain for all intents and 
purposes, thus providing some assurance of the nature and extent of the bank’s 
involvement prior to embarking on the project.   
 
 In a different approach to the above issues, some scholars appear to have 
indicated that, although prior determination of the price of units is unacceptable in 
decreasing partnership for ventures, this would be the case only where the sale is 
envisaged to take place between the bank and the client only.  If the bank had 
reserved the right to sell its share either to the client or to another party at its 
discretion, thus leaving the possibility of transaction open ended, in this event, a 
price could be fixed at the outset for its sale to the client without objection.28  
Accordingly, due to the sale not being arranged to take place exclusively between 
the bank and the client, it seems that the client’s promise to purchase could spell 
out the intended price.  This is not construed as a guarantee of the bank’s capital.   
 
 However, in view of the conventional banking theory dominating the practice of 
Islamic banking currently, it appears prudent that all possibility of a prior fixing of 
                                                 
26 ‛Abd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah, vol. 24, p. 298.    
27 Imām al-Shāfi‛i has ascribed the necessity for choice in such unilateral or mutual 
promises to the possibility of the promise becoming a sale of what is not owned by the 
seller or a contingent sale, such as in a promise to purchase on murabahah.  See 
Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‛i, al-Umm, Bayrūt, Dar al-Ma‛rifah, 1393H, vol. 3, p. 39.  
The Islamic Fiqh Academy, in its resolution on discharging promise and murābahah, has 
referred to the first reason.  See Islamic Fiqh Academy, resolution No. 40, 41, (2/5 & 3/5), 
5th Session held in Kuwait in December 1988.        
28 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, p. 92.  There remains 
some ambiguity on this issue, as the promise here is offered by the client.     
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the sale price be curtailed, and the promise, as mentioned above in the context of 
decreasing partnership for asset purchases, not be held legally binding.29  Through 
this measure, the sale of units taking place with the choice of the parties at a price 
suitable to both of them could be ensured.  Thus, the spirit of equity participation 
could be retained in the decreasing partnership arrangement, disallowing any 
compulsion on either party to sell his share to the other or to purchase the other’s 
share except on the basis of free will at the time of such transaction.  With regard to 
MMEs that operate amidst various financial constraints, such freedom in deciding 
the time of purchase could be crucial in managing the finances of the enterprise.  A 
business enterprise being a prospect naturally subject to various phases and ups and 
downs, inflexible restrictions pertaining to the price or time of sale could lead to a 
violation of the rights of either party, as well as being alien to the basic concept of 
equity partnership based on sharing of gains and losses.  Although the parties could 
have an understanding or even proffer promises that are of a non-binding nature on 
how unit sales should take place, they would be allowed complete choice on the 
issue at the time of carrying out the transaction, based on the prevailing state of 
affairs.  While ensuring participation in the venture with an enhanced sense of 
responsibility and entrepreneurship on the part of both the bank and the client, this 
method would effectively remove any resemblance to interest based financing.   
 
 Regarding the prospect that if the promise not be held binding, in the event the 
client refuses to purchase the bank’s share, the bank would be burdened with 
prolonged participation in a venture that may not be performing up to expectations 
thus affecting its liquidity, a closer analysis could reveal this apprehension to be 
groundless.  According to all schools of Islamic law, the partners in shirkah al-‛aqd 
are entitled to terminate the partnership at any stage.30  Thus, unless if the parties 
had altered this default provision through agreeing on any other terms at the 
inception31, the right to liquidate the partnership thereby recovering whatever that 
is possible to be recovered is available to every partner.  This has been provided 
precisely in order to prevent any party being compelled to continue involvement in 
a venture against his will, and appears especially suitable with regard to MMEs.  
                                                 
29 It was noted above that an early resolution on the subject called for complete choice to 
both partners in the sale of their shares. (First Conference of Islamic banking held in Dubai, 
May 1979, Resolution on decreasing partnership structure, in Dubai Islamic Bank, Fatāwā 
Shar‛iyyah fī al-A‛māl al-Masrafiyyah, p. 21.)  See section above on allowing client the 
option to purchase or continue lease.       
30 Abu Zakariyya Al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, Bayrūt, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, n.d., 
vol. 4, p. 515, Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Radd al-Muhtār, vol. 4, p. 328, Abu Bakr al-Sarkhasi, al-
Mabsūt, Bayrūt, Dar al-Ma‛rifah, 1406H, vol. 16, p. 194, Ibn Rushd al-Qurtubi, Bidāyah al-
Mujtahid, al-Qāhirah, Maktabah al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyyah, 1969, vol. 2, p. 277, Ibn 
Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, p. 133.   
31 To prevent the secession of a partner resulting in the termination of the musharakah, 
some agreements stipulate that a partner who wishes to resign should do so through selling 
his share to the remaining partners.   
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Therefore, if the MME partner refuses to purchase the bank’s share on favourable 
terms, the latter could resort to the ultimate measure of liquidating the venture, so 
that the parties could exit from the partnership dividing the assets equitably among 
them.  It could be observed that, if this right is maintained unaltered in decreasing 
partnership in ventures, the need for a legally binding promise or prior fixing of the 
price in order to sell one’s share on reasonable terms could be dispensed with to a 
great extent. 
 
Participation of the bank in the enterprise 
 
 Contrary to a conventional bank, the Islamic bank need not restrict its 
involvement in the enterprise to that of a financier, except in mudarabah-financed 
projects.  Even in the latter, the bank may appoint its staff in a monitoring capacity, 
without executive power.32  In musharakah, as an equity partner entitled to play an 
active role in management, decision-making and operations, the bank may fully 
participate in and contribute towards the successful performance of the enterprise.  
In larger projects, it may assign staff of its own solely working for the enterprise 
providing various services.  By calling on its market awareness, business 
connections, management expertise etc, the bank may become vigorously involved, 
progressively eliminating the inherited identity as a lending institution, to that of a 
commercial associate indispensable for the successful operation of the project, 
worthy of a sizable share of profits.  With regard to MMEs, such effective 
participation may lead to twin-fold benefit: it will enable the bank to monitor the 
performance of the venture in a factual and up-to-date manner, rather than depend 
on information provided by the client partner; in addition, the bank may take timely 
action in preventing unhealthy developments and avoiding complications 
inexperienced MMEs may encounter.  An area banks may provide an invaluable 
service to budding MMEs is that of financial management.  It is known that a 
significant percentage of MMEs fail during the early period itself due to 
incompetence in managing their finances and lack of adequate planning.  An 
Islamic bank coming as a business partner with reserves of expertise in these fields 
could reduce such avoidable failures greatly, and help enhance the success rate of 
its clients, also gaining credence for itself in the process. 
                                                 
32 Al-Māwardi has narrated two positions regarding appointing such an overseer, one of 
which indicates permissibility.  (Abu al-Hasan al-Māwardi, al-Hāwi al-Kabīr, Bayrūt, Dar 
al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1999, vol. 7, p. 312)  However, when the overseer appointed by the 
investor is expressly precluded from any executive role, there does not seem to be any 
reason for impermissibility. 
